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OF HAMMERS AND SAWS: THE TOOLBOX OF
FEDERALISM AND SOURCES OF LAW FOR THE WEB
THOMAS A. LANE*
I. INTRODUCTION
Federalism is a fact of American law. It might be viewed as a "sacred cow,"' or
more generously as "a value that deserves independent consideration," 2 or more
simply as a "first principle."3 But it is a fact, and it is within the framework of
federalism that law in the United States will be developed and applied to the Internet
and World Wide Web.4
This comment argues that federalism is in fact particularly well suited to the
development of law for the Web.5 It may be "one world, one Web" in the sense that
the Web is a globally shared resource. Such a perspective suggests that it would be
beneficial to have areas of law that are consistent internationally. But it is also "a
world of Webs," with multiple interconnecting but distinct networks, multiple
interacting groups of users, and multiple and diverse potential legal issues. This
approach suggests that a diversity of local law would be beneficial in certain areas
as well.6
The conflict between a pressure for consistency in Web law, on the one hand, and
a role for diversity, on the other, creates the first underlying theme of this comment.
There is no single answer for how to best apply law to the Web. The legal tool best
suited for deterring child pornography differs from the legal tool best suited for
establishing a standard of care for tort negligence on the part of Web site operators.
The second underlying theme is that the Web, though a fundamentally new way
of communicating among people, is nevertheless a human creation. Its newness
suggests that new law will, at times, be appropriate. Its human roots, in turn, suggest
that much existing law can be applied to the Web, with varying degrees of
modification. Some new legal tools may need to be created, but many old tools
remain viable.7
* Class of 2003, University of New Mexico School of Law. The author thanks Professor Marsha Baum
for her patient, thorough, and vigorous reviews of this comment. Prior to enrolling in law school the author worked
at Los Alamos National Laboratory, where he served as Information Architecture (IA) Standards Editor, IA Web
Team Leader, and Laboratory Representative to the Advisory Committee of the World Wide Web Consortium.
1. Jonathan R. Macey, Federal Deference to Local Regulators and the Economic Theory of Regulation:
Toward a Public-Choice Explanation of Federalism, 76 VA. L. REV. 265, 265 (1990).
2. Gary T. Schwartz, Considering the Proper Federal Role in American Tort Law, 38 ARMZ. L. REV 917,
919 (1996).
3. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 552 (1995).
4. For this comment, "Web" will be used in a generic sense to refer to the World Wide Web itself, the
underlying Internet, and the related functions such as electronic mail and newsgroups. Where distinctions among
the types of functions are needed, more precise terminology will be used. In general, though, the Web is the
interface through which most users access and experience the various aspects of the Internet.
5. For this comment, "law" is viewed in a broad sense. It includes governmental law, such as statutory and
common law, as well as non-governmental sources of regulation, control, or influence, such as the voluntary
technical standards developed by the World Wide Web Consortium (W3C).
6. Obviously, "local" in a Web sense is not the same as "local" in a geographic sense. State boundaries are
not always the best way to segregate issues related to the Web. In some instances, though, state boundaries remain
meaningful. For example, nothing about the nature of the Web suggests that a business license for an Internet
Service Provider (ISP) should be any different from licenses for more traditional neighboring businesses.
7. Cf. Lawrence Lessig, The Law ofthe Horse: What Cyberlaw Might Teach, 113 HARv. L. REV. 501,50102 (1999) [hereinafter Lessig I] (discussing whether the "law of cyberspace" has value as a distinct discipline, or
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U.S. federalism is flexible enough to accommodate law from many sources:
international, federal, local, and non-governmental. Federalism can adapt existing
law to new situations while concurrently providing avenues for the creation of new

law. The Web creates a diversity of legal needs; federalism offers a diversity of legal
tools.
This comment offers a general exploration of the federalist legal toolbox, as
currently and potentially applicable to the Web. It begins with overviews of the
natures of the Web, international law,' the federalist system, and non-governmental
sources of regulation. Against this backdrop, this comment examines the recent U.S.
Supreme Court ruling on the constitutionality of the Child Pornography Prevention
Act (CPPA),9 an act that demonstrates both successes 0 and failures" in applying
federal law to the Web. Finally, the comment offers suggestions regarding which
source of law-international, federal, state, or non-governmental-is best suited to
addressing particular legal issues regarding the Web.
I.THE NATURE OF THE WEB

By now, certain observations about the Web are very nearly truisms. The Web is

global in scope, extending to all seven continents.' 2 A population of users is quick
to proclaim the independence and ungovernability of the Web.' 3 Some users take
advantage of the perceived anonymity of the Web to escape behavioral constraints
of the "real world."' 4 Combined, these factors can lead to an impression of a "Wild
Wild Web," an electronic version of lawless old Tombstone in the days of the O.K.
Corral.
Such an impression is, however, flawed. As Lawrence Lessig has pointed out,
there are multiple mechanisms for applying law to the Web."' Once identified,
individual users can be brought before court.' 6 Software can utilize authentication
and authorization to identify users and control access to content and permissible
activities.' 7 The underlying protocols themselves can be altered to control activity."'

whether it might be better left to the existing tools of law).
8. In the U.S. federalist scheme, international law is applied within the country through internal U.S.
mechanisms such as treaty ratifications. See infra notes 65 and 66.
9. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 122 S. Ct. 1389 (2002) (deciding constitutionality of Child
Pornography Prevention Act, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-28 (1996) (codified in scattered sections of 18
U.S.C.)).
10. In criminalizing the distribution of actual child pornography via the Web. See infra note 156.
11. In attempting to criminalize the distribution of virtual child pornography via the Web. See infra note 153.
12. See, e.g., Yahoo! listing of Web sites by region, at http://dir.yahoo.com/Regional/Regions/ (last visited
Jan. 8, 2003) (leading to links such as Web pages from Antarctica).
13. See, e.g., LAWRENCE LEsSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 4-5 (1999) [hereinafter LESSIG
IH]
(describing the perception that the Web "could only be free").
14. See, e.g., id. at 14-17 (discussing "Jake," who posted "graphic and repulsive" stories to the alt.sex. stories
newsgroup).
15. Id. at 30-42 (discussing "architectures of control").
16. See, e.g., United States v. Morris, 928 F.2d 504 (2d Cir. 1991) (citing Morris under 18 U.S.C. § 1030
fora "worm" that caused damage to government computers); Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44 (D.D.C. 1998)
(adjudicating a defamation action against Matt Drudge).
17. Authentication and authorization are related, but distinct, actions. Authentication establishes the identity
of a user; authorization controls what that user, once identified, is permitted to do. Authentication is the key to a
doorlock; authorization, the size of the room behind the door. See, e.g., Cisco Systems, "authentication" and
"authorization," in Internetworking Terms and Acronyms, at http://www.cisco.com/univercd/cc/td/doc/cisintwk/
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A. The ProtocolLayer

At its core, the Web is not beyond regulation; at its core, it is simply a collection
of protocols. 9 The basic Internet protocols are processing and formatting rules that
enable computers to communicate with each other across a series of interconnected
but independently operated computer networks. 2' The Web, in turn, is an overlay of
protocols that makes it simple for users to navigate and use the underlying Internet.2
Added to the mix are a variety of file fbrmat protocols that enable a receiving
computer to communicate to its user what the sending computer has sent, including
text, 22 images, 2' and movies.24 A separate group of protocols addresses securityrelated concerns such as encryption" and25authentication. 21
These protocols can be separated into what can be called global protocols, public
protocols, and private protocols, each of which warrants separate legal
consideration. Global protocols are those that every user's machine must support if
that user is to utilize the Web at all. The most obvious example is the Internet
Protocol (IP); 27 if a user's machine does not support this basic protocol, then no
communication across the Internet is possible. 8
A global protocol demands global definition, but it conversely invites little legal
intrusion. Because the protocol must be followed in order to use the network, there
is little that the law can add in terms of coercion or deterrence. Furthermore, in order
to be global, these protocols must be made public, thereby ensuring independent
review of their effectiveness and trustworthiness. 29 International technical
ita/al2.htm (last posted Mar. 29, 2002).
18. See LESSIG II, supra note 13, at 51-53 (describing the effects of regulating code, including the limitations of the likely resistance).
19. Beneath the protocols, there are two additional layers. The first is the hardware, the machinery and
wiring of the various computers and connections that form the physical foundation for the Web. The second layer
is composed of the operating systems, such as Windows or Unix, that enable the hardware to understand and process
the Internet protocols. Neither of these layers is unique to the Web, and the legal issues regarding both are beyond
the scope of this comment.
20. See RFC 791: Internet Protocol § 2.1 Relation to Other Protocols (Internet Engineering Task Force
(IETF) Request for Comment (RFC) 1981), at http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc791 .txt?number791.
21. See RFC 2616: Hypertext Transfer Protocol--HTTP/1.1 § 1.1 Purpose (IETF RFC June 1999), at
http://www.w3.org/Protocols/rfc2616/rfc2616.txt.
22. See, e.g., HTML 4.01 Specification § 5.1 The Document Character Set (World Wide Web Consortium
(W3C) Recommendation 1999), at http://www.w3.org/TRIhtml4Ol/charset.html#h-5.1 (last visited Jan. 8, 2003).
23. See Joe Bums, Image Formats on the Web, HTML Goodies, at http://www.htmlgoodies.comltutors/
image_formats.html (last visited Jan. 8, 2003); IA-6801: Electronic Image Formats and Compression Algorithms
§ 0.1 Image Formats (Los Alamos National Laboratory Information Architecture Project White Paper 1998) (on
file with NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW).
24. See, e.g., MPEG-2 FAQ § I What is MPEG? (Apr. 2, 1996) (Berkeley Multimedia Research Center),
at http://bmrc.berkeley.edu/frame/research/mpeg/mpeg2faq.html.
25. E.g., FIPS PUB 46-2: Data Encryption Standard(DES) (Federal Information Processing Standards
Publication, National Bureau of Standards) (Dec. 30, 1993), at http://www.itl.nist.gov/fipspubs/fip46-2.htm.
26. E.g., RFC 1994: PPPChallenge Handshake Authentication Protocol (CHAP) (IETF RFC Aug. 1996),
at http://www.rfc-editor.orglrfc/rfc 1994.txt.
27. RFC 791: Internet Protocol,supra note 20.
28. This is a bit of an overstatement. Protocols other than IP can be used to communicate over limited
portions of the infrastructure underlying the Web, if that infrastructure is specially configured. Standard IP is
needed, however, to communicate across the overall global resource that is the Web.
29. An ongoing theme in this comment is that protocols and software that are exposed to public review are
less likely to contain hidden viruses, bugs, or vulnerabilities, because a large number of independent readers will
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organizations already exist for the development and publication of global
protocols.3" There is little that government could add to what these groups are
already doing, and the direct specification of global protocols stands as a clear
example of an area where government should not interfere.
Public protocols are those that are openly published and that a user needs to adopt
in order to perform a particular action, but that the user need not adopt unless he/she
chooses to perform that action. For example, the Internet Relay Chat Protocol
(IRC) 31 is openly published and supported by a number of different products. 32 A
user who chooses to participate in an IRC chat room must have IRC-supporting
software installed, but a user has no need for such software if he/she chooses not to
participate in a chat room or if he/she prefers a chat room based on a different
protocol (such as AOL Instant Messenger).
In general, a public protocol seems to invite almost no legal control. It is openly
published, so any hidden viruses can be easily exposed. It does not require global
conformity, since it is only used by a sub-group of users. It is not subject to
monopolization, since anyone who chooses to write a program to support it can do
so. Absent some sort of complicating issue, there seems little reason to interfere.33
A private protocol is a privately owned, unpublished protocol. In general, a user
who wishes to use the protocol must obtain software from the owner of the protocol.
An obvious example is the file format used for Microsoft Word. A user who wishes
to create, view, or edit a document in this format must generally obtain software
from Microsoft.34
From the outset, a private protocol becomes a subject of law. The creation and
fixation of the protocol invokes copyright; 35 any misappropriation of the private
protocol would be subject to copyright remedies. 36 Furthermore, because the private
protocols are secret, there is no opportunity for independent readers to verify
whether there might be hidden vulnerabilities or other flaws embedded within the
have had the opportunity to review them for just such flaws.
30. E.g.,IETFhomepageathttp:/Iwww.ietf.org(lastvisitedJan.8,2003);W3Chomepageathttp://www.
w3c.org (last modified Jan. 2, 2003).
31. RFC 1459: Internet Relay Chat Protocol (IETF RFC May 1993), at http://www.ietf.org/rfc/
rfc 1459.txt?number-= 1459.

32. See, e.g., Tucows Chat-IRC product listings athttp://www.tucows.com/circ95.html, http://mac.tucows.
com/circmac.html, and http://linux.tucows.com/intemet/irc.html (last visited Jan. 8, 2003).
33. One such complicating issue has involved the national security concerns associated with encryption
software based on public protocols such as Secure Socket Layers (SSL). See, e.g., COMPUTER SCIENCE AND
TELECOMMUNICATIONS BOARD, NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, CRYPTOGRAPHY'S ROLE IN SECURING THE
INFORMATION SOCIETY, ch. 4 Export Controls (1996), available at http://www.nap.edu/readingroom/books/crisis/

chapter4.txt (discussing the application of export controls to encryption software under the Arms Export Control
Act (AECA) of 1949 and the Export Administration Act (EAA)). The complete text of the report is available at
http://www.nap.edu/readingroom/books/crisisL.
34. The alternatives are to obtain software from a manufacturer licensed by the protocol owner, to obtain
pirated copies of the software, or to obtain a legally "reverse engineered" compatible product. For a discussion of
software piracy, see Eric H. Holder, Jr., Remarks at a Press Conference Announcing the Intellectual Property Rights
Initiative (July 23, 1999), at http://www.cybercrime.gov/dagipini.htm; for a discussion of reverse engineering and
its legal status under the "fair use" doctrine of U.S. copyright law, 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000), see Sega Enterprises
Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510 (1993).
35. Copyright law also protects global and public protocols, but because they have been made freely
available, there is no cause of action if they are in fact used. There may, however, be a cause of action if a global
or public protocol is modified into a private protocol and then used for profit.
36. Subject to the "fair use" exception for reverse engineering. Sega, 977 F.2d at 1510.
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protocol itself. The possibility of such vulnerabilities
38 or flaws, in turn, creates the
37
potential for actions under both contract and tort.
B. The Software Layer
On top of the protocols themselves, there are the various software programs used
to implement the protocols. One major division among software programs is
between open-source software, whose underlying human-readable source code is
made readily available to the public,39 and private, proprietary software, whose
source code is guarded as a trade secret.' There is a further distinction among the
proprietary software between "shareware," which is freely distributed but which
users are expected to voluntarily pay for, and what is sometimes called
"shrinkware,"' which frequently comes in shrink-wrapped packages and which
users must pay for before the software can be installed.42
As with the underlying protocols, the software that is the most open and public
invites the least legal intrusion. The more accessible the source code, the better the
opportunity for independent readers to ensure that it lacks hidden viruses and will
in fact perform as advertised.43 The better the opportunities for correcting potential
problems before they become problems, the lower the need for legal interference.
Conversely, the software that is least open to public review-private software,
whether shareware or shrinkware-has a high potential need for legal control. When
the source code of software is not open to independent review, the users lose their
independent source of protection against hidden viruses, bugs, or other
"undocumented features."' This loss of before-the-fact informal protection

37. For example, the product did not perform as advertised. See U.C.C. § 2-314 (1989) (defining an implied
warranty of merchantability).
38. For example, the product caused harm. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTORTS § 6 cmt. a (1965) (stating
types of tortious conduct).
39. See, e.g., Free Software Foundation, at http://www.gnu.orglfsf/fsf.html (updated June 12, 2002).
40. E.g., Microsoft Office and its components.
41. "Shrinkware" is a descriptive term used informally among the software community. It was used, for
example, by Lou Grinzo in the final paragraph of "Lowering the Net for Open Source." Dr. Dobb's Journal, Sept.
20, 1999, at http://www.ddj.comldocuments/s=891/ddj9975o/9975o.htm.
42. Some software is a hybrid. The Linux operating system, for example, is open-source software, but
companies such as Red Hat offer shrinkware versions of Linux. Red Hat takes the open-source Linux, certifies it,
compiles it into machine-readable form, puts it onto convenient CDs, shrink wraps the package, and provides
customers with technical support. Users who purchase shrinkware Red Hat Linux are paying for the convenience
that results from Red Hat's services, not the Linux itself. Linux remains open source, while Red Hat Linux remains
shrinkware. See Red Hat Linux Operating System, at http://www.redhat.com/software/linux/ (last visited Jan. 8,
2003).
43. In theory, the openness of source code also makes it easier for malicious hackers to discover security
holes within the software. In practice, however, if malicious hackers can find the security holes, so can benevolent
security professionals who are quick to communicate the flaw to others so that it can be corrected before it is
exploited. For example, as Linux gained popularity, a series of security holes were rapidly exposed and
communicated, along with fixes as they became available. For example, the Computer Emergency Response Team
(CERT) at Carnegie Mellon University issued the following security advisories as Linux was gaining in popularity:
CA-1999-03 FTP Buffer Overflows, at http://www.cert.org/advisories/CA-1999-03.html (last revised July 7, 1999);
CA- 1998-12 Remotely Exploitable Buffer Overflow Vulnerability in mountd, at http://www.cert.org/advisories/CA1998-12.html (last revised Nov. 9, 1998); CA-1998-05 Multiple Vulnerabilities in BIND, at http://www.cert.org/
advisories/CA-1998-05.html (last revised Nov. 16, 1998).
44. "Undocumented feature" is an informal euphemism for software performing in unexpected ways,
regardless of the degree of inconvenience and/or damage the unexpected behavior causes.
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increases the potential need for after-the-fact legal protection, which in turn invites
the potential
application of contract law,45 tort law,46 and, perhaps, personal property
47
law.

Furthermore, a tort action for negligence against a provider of private software
might be appropriate if software is sold that lacks adequate security. The first step
here would be a fact pattern where a hacker exploited a security flaw in the software
to gain access and cause damage to a user's computer. The next step would be to
establish that the user had a reasonable expectation that such harm would not occur.
The third step would be to establish that the software provider had a duty to provide
reasonably secure software, that the provider failed to meet its reasonable standard
of care in incorporating security into the software, and that the lack of reasonable
care was a proximate cause of the damage to the user's computer. From this pattern
might flow a tort action for negligence, which in turn might
encourage providers of
48
private software to improve their attention to security.
C. The Human Layer
On top of the layers of protocols and software, there are the people who use the
Web. Such people may be individuals or members of groups or employees of
corporations that have a distinct legal "personhood."4 9 They may be users who seek
the content and services available on the Web, providers of such content and
services, operators who run the sites comprised by the Web, or any combination of
the above. They may access the Web through a typical browser, or they may employ
software such as "spiders"5 to automatically search the Web and gather content on
their behalf. Whatever the case, the common denominator is that these are people,
humans, with all the associated behaviors.

45. Cf. U.S.C. § 2-314 (discussing contract for private protocols).
46. Cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 38 (discussing tort for private protocols).
47. A conversion action might arise, for example, if a hidden virus has caused the user's machine to be used
in ways that the user did not want. Cf. infra note 208 and accompanying text. Personal property actions are more
likely for software than for protocols because, while protocols define passive rules, software actively accesses the
computer system. In addition, private software creates a heightened interest for the software provider in the
application of intellectual property law.
48. Consider the following scenario: A major software provider offers an upgrade to a popular email
program. Users adopt the upgrade. A student in Southeast Asia sends out an email message containing an
attachment that exploits a vulnerability in the email program and its integrated scripting program. Millions of
computers become infected, networks across the world become overloaded and shut down, and untold economic
damages are caused. In brief, that is what happened with the "ILove You" virus. See CNN, "Love Bug" Takes on
the World, May 5, 2000, at http://www.cnn.com/2000IWORLD/europe/05/05/virus.world/.
The student who wrote the "ILove You" virus was prosecuted in the Philippines, but a question that was
not addressed was whether the manufacturer of the software, Microsoft in this case, might be held liable under tort
negligence for offering an email product that permitted such widespread harm to be done. The manufacturer would
likely put forward a defense based on warranty limitations, but that defense can fail if the limitations are found to
be unconscionable. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACrS § 208 (1981); UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2302 (1989).
49. See, e.g., Louisville, Cincinnati & Charleston R.R. Co. v. Letson, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 497 (1844); Marshall
v. Baltimore & Ohio. R.R. Co., 57 U.S. (16 How.) 314 (1853). Under these cases, a corporation is a "person" in a
constitutional sense even though it is not a "citizen"; the corporation can sue and be sued, for example, but it cannot
vote. Id.
50. Software that automatically searches across Web sites.
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Such behaviors range from the perfectly legal and arguably praiseworthy5 to the
criminal.12 In the middle ground, Web users seem to display all of the characteristics
of human behavior, subject on the one hand to the physical constraints of Web
technology, but on the other hand sometimes emboldened by the Web's shortage of
behavioral constraints. 3 Users get happy; users get angry; users get disappointed;
users reveal difficult truths;54 and users lie, cheat, and cause harm.
Law, in its various manifestations, only exists in response to human behavior.
Because human behavior is exhibited on the Web, law for the Web, whether new or
adapted, becomes necessary. Legal actions so far have included the tort of
defamation, 5 copyright infringement, 56 and crimes such as unauthorized access and
harm to computer systems. 7 There is no reason to expect that actions will stop there;
rather, there is ample reason to believe that torts for the Web will eventually expand
to test such areas as negligence, 58 negligent infliction of emotional distress,59 and6
loss of consortium.6 There are likely to be actions testing new areas of contract '
and property law.62
The diversity of the Web itself, and the diversity of its users' behaviors, suggests
that a diversity of law is needed to address the issues that arise. A diversity of law,
in turn, suggests a diversity of legal mechanisms. This need for diversity supports
the proposition that the U.S. system of federalism is particularly well suited to the
development of law for the Web.

51. Such as the Wildlife Conservation Society's efforts to promote conservation through its Web site, at
http://wcs.org/ (last visited Jan. 8, 2003), or the United Nations' and U.S. Congress's efforts to promote the
accessibility of law, at http://www.un.org/law (last visited Jan. 9, 2003) and http://thomas.loc.gov (last visited Jan.
9, 2003), respectively.
52. The creation and distribution of child pornography, for example, is an internationally recognized crime.
See, e.g., CNN, Dozens Arrested in Child Porn Probe, Mar. 18, 2002, at http://www.cnn.com/2002US/
03/18/fbi.child.porn/index.html; CNN, Web Child Porn Ring Broken, Aug. 10, 2002, at http://www.cnn.com/2002/
US/08/09/internet.child.por.bust/index.html (both describing prosecutions arising from the creation and online
distribution of child pornography).
53. See LESSIG I, supra note 13.
54. See Robyn Wagner, Comment, Don't Shoot the Messenger: Limiting the Liability of Anonymous
Remailer Operations, 32 N.M. L. REV. 99, 114 (2002) (discussing how anonymous remailers facilitate discussions
among victims of child abuse or AIDS).
55. E.g., Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44 (D.D.C. 1998).
56. E.g., Playboy Enterprises v. Webbworld, 991 F. Supp. 543 (N.D. Tex. 1997).
57. E.g., United States v. Morris, 928 F.2d 504 (2d Cir. 1991).
58. For example, if an ISP fails to adequately protect a user's personal private information from outside
hackers, there may be a malpractice-type action. See Lane, infra note 125.
59. For the purposes of the bystander rule, it is unclear who is a "bystander" in the context of the Web or
what the Web equivalent of "contact" is.
60. It is unclear how "consortium" might be defined within the context of Web and whether its loss can be
considered a legal harm.
61. In general, the Hadley v. Baxendale rule of contracts provides that consequential damages are only
available if the damages were foreseeable at the time the contract was made. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 717 (7th
ed. 1999). It has not been established what the parameters of this rule would be for transactions conducted on the
Web.
62. There may be a conversion aspect to a hacker wrongfully using another user's account. Cf infra note
208. Also, there may be an argument that a "cyber-squatter" can use a trademarked Web address for long enough
and actively enough to establish adverse possession.
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11. THE NATURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
In the modem world, international law provides the broad framework within
which national law operates. The United States may be the world's lone remaining
superpower, and it may be slower than other countries in adopting specific
international agreements such as the Kyoto Protocol63 or the Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court.64 Still, the United States is a member of the
international community, and international law provides the framework for U.S. law.
International law is incorporated into U.S. federalism through various65
mechanisms, primarily operating at the federal level. For example, both treaties
and implementing legislation' can be used to incorporate international agreements
into federal law, thereby bringing such agreements within the scope of the
Supremacy Clause. 67 Furthermore, both state and federal courts can hear cases based
on international law.68 International law therefore plays a role in the U.S. federalist
scheme.
Because the Web is an international resource, there is an immediate appeal to the
idea of using international law to govern it. In theory, this would provide for global
consistency, enabling, for example, a Calcutta businessman to perform transactions
across the Web with a consistent set of expectations regarding the validity and
enforceability of the contracts behind such transactions. Such an ideal would
conceivably carry many benefits.
In fact, however, international law has limitations. It is primarily a law among
nations, not a law among individuals. It is rooted in the Treaty of Westphalia,69
which in turn is based on seventeenth century concepts of national sovereignty. Each
country becomes a legal entity under international law, akin to the way that
corporations became legal "persons" under U.S. law during the nineteenth century.70

63. Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, December 10, 1997,
37 I.L.M. 32.
64. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 183/9, available
at http://www.un.org/law/icc/statuteromefra.htm.
65. E.g., U.N. CHARTER, 59 Stat. 1031 (1945) (treaty ratified by Senate).

66. E.g., North American Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 103-102 (1993)
(congressional act to implement trade agreement).

67. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
68. E.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1605 (2000) (codifying a U.S. principle that even foreign countries can be subject to
federal or state courts in certain circumstances); Christopher v. Harbury, 122 S. Ct. 2179, 2185-90 (2002)
(considering international law in tort action against CIA); Price v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 294
F.3d 82, 98-99 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (stating, "We would break with the norms of international law and the structure of
domestic law were we to extend a constitutional rule meant to protect individual liberty so as to frustrate the United
States government's clear statutory command that Libya be subject to the jurisdiction of the federal courts in the
circumstances of this case"); Register of Wills v. Arrowsmith, 778 A.2d 364, 376-81 (Md. App. 2001) (considering
international law arguments regarding estate taxes); Busby v. Alaska, 40 P.3d 807, 813-16 (Ct. App. Alaska 2002)
(considering international law arguments regarding driver's license revocations).

69. Peace Treaty Between the Holy Roman Emperor and the King of France and Their Respective Allies,
October 24, 1648, available at http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/westphal.htm.
70. E.g., Louisville, Cincinnati & Charleston R.R. Co. v. Letson, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 497 (1844); Marshall v.

Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co., 57 U.S. (16 How.) 314 (1853). These decisions were rooted in the concept that a
corporation needed to be a "person" in a constitutional sense in order to sue, be sued, or, as a consequence, obtain
constitutional protections. Similarly, a nation must be a legal entity in order for it to enter into treaties or otherwise
operate within the framework of international law.
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International law has been extended to the activities of individuals, but only in
certain cases. If an individual's actions can be attributed to a state, then that state can
be held liable for those actions.7 1 If an individual has violatedjus cogens" norms of
international law, then that individual can be held accountable under international
law, but such jus cogens norms have, so far, extended only to what have been
widely recognized as wrongful acts such as piracy,7 3 genocide,74 war crimes such as
torture or taking of hostages,75 and crimes against humanity such as murder or
enslavement.76 Nothing on the Web has approached77such levels of harm, though it
seems plausible that some actions eventually might.
The agencies of international law have a similar bias in favor of state actions and
against individual actions. The founding statute of the International Court of Justice

(ICJ) requires that nations be parties to actions brought before it.78 An individual

who seeks to bring an action in this framework must first convince his/her
government to bring an action on his/her behalf. Government intervention on behalf
of individual citizens is far from automatic.79 Other international courts, such as the
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia,8 ° do bring actions

against individuals, but their creation requires action by the United Nations, which
in turn requires agreement among multiple countries.8 Such mechanisms seem
designed to deal with specialized, relatively short-term problems, and they do not
seem likely to offer an individual plaintiff anything resembling "speedy relief."82

71. E.g., Responsibility ofStatesfor InternationallyWrongful Actions (RSJWA), Int'l L.Comm'n, U.N. Doc.
AICN.4/L.602/Rev. 1 (2001), available at http://www.un.org/law/ilc/sessions/52/53docs.htm; Concerning United
States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), 1980 LC.J. 3 (May 24).
72. "A mandatory norm of general international law from which no two or more nations may exempt
themselves or release one another." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 864 (7th ed. 1999).
73. Third United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, part VI1, arts. 100-107, Dec. 10, 1982, U.N.
Doc. A/Conf.62/121, 21 I.L.M. 1245 (1982), available at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/conventionagreements
/texts/unclos/closindx.htm.
74. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra note 64, part 1, art. 1; part 2, art. 6.
75. Id. at art. 8.
76. Jd. at art. 7.
77. The problem for the 2002 Philip C. Jessup International Law Moot Court Competition, for example,
included a hypothetical where a hacker from one country used the Internet to hack into and disable another country's
rail scheduling system, leading to the collision of two trains and the deaths of hundreds of crew and passengers. The
2002 Philip C. Jessup International Law Moot Court Competition Compromis, Republic of Turingia v. Republic
of Babbage: Concerning Regulation of Access to the Internet, II 20-21 (on file with the NEw MEXICO LAW
REVIEW). As reliance on the Web continues to grow, so does the possibility that a Web-based attack can lead to
significant physical harm, thereby moving closer to the realm of crimes against humanity.
78. Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, art. 34, para. 1, 59 Stat. 1055, 1059.
79. Note the difficulties the Berenson family has had in seeking U.S. government assistance in the case of
Lori Berenson, held in Peru. See, e.g., CNN, Court in Peru Upholds Berenson Sentence, Feb. 18, 2002, at
http://www.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/americaslO2/18/berenson.peruindex.html.
80. Homepage at http://www.un.orglicty/index.html (last visited Jan. 8, 2003).
81. See, e.g., Statute of the International Tribunal, S. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25,
1993) (amended by S. Res. 1166 and 1329), availableat http://www.un.org/icty/basic/statut/statute.htm.
82. During the writing of this comment, the founding statute for the International Criminal Court (I.C.C.)
went into effect. See supra note 64. It seems too early to offer a balanced assessment of the I.C.C. The goals are
laudable and there is reason to hope that the court can succeed at offering a permanent neutral forum for crimes such
as war crimes. There are, however, two significant limitations. First, the court's jurisdiction is limited to major
crimes, which would exclude civil actions and all but the most egregious Web crimes. And second, the United States
is not a signatory to the I.C.C. treaty. Absent U.S. cooperation, any sort of tribunal will face serious practical
difficulties in applying any sort of law to the Web. See U.N., Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court:
Overview, at http://www.un.orgllaw/icc/general/overview.htm (last visited Jan. 8, 2003); Communication from U.S.
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Individual actions under international law can be brought in municipal courts,
however.83 Historically, municipal courts have been used prominently to prosecute
piracy, which has long been recognized as an international crime and which has a
long tradition of being prosecuted in whatever municipal court happens to establish
personal jurisdiction over the defendants.' The difficulties in municipal courts are
threefold: first, the international law must be established; second, the court must
establish personal jurisdiction over the defendant; and third, the court must be able
to enforce meaningful relief for the plaintiff should judgment be found in plaintiff s
favor.
The first of these prongs, defining the law, might on its face seem the easiest to
establish, but even it invites problems. International law is not like the common law,
in that international law relies on the behavior of and agreements among nations
rather than prior judges' interpretations of specific situations. 5 In international law,
stare decisis does not exist as the common law knows it. This leads to an
unwieldiness and lethargy in developing new law. For example, the International
Law Commission (ILC) has been working on the Responsibility of States for
Internationally Wrongful Actions 6 for more than 50 years. Although the current
draft is a praiseworthy expression of what international law on the subject should
be, it remains a draft, not yet adopted by the General Assembly, and not yet carrying
anything more than persuasive force under international law. The Web will not
wait fifty years for its law to be developed.88
Of the three prongs, if defining the law is in fact difficult, the next two,
establishing personal jurisdiction and enforcing a judgment, can approach
impossibility. Personal jurisdiction would depend upon the cooperation of the
defendant or his/her home country,89 and enforceability would depend on a variety
of factors. Enforcement of criminal incarceration would require either physical
custody over the defendant or the cooperation of the defendant's home country;
enforcement of monetary criminal penalties or civil damages awards would require

Government to U.N. Secretary General, May 6, 2002 ("This is to inform you, in connection with the Rome Statute
of the International Criminal Court adopted on July 17, 1998, that the United States does not intend to become a
party to the treaty."), http://untreaty.un.org/ENGLISH/bible/englishintemetbible/partIlchapterxvHutreatylo.
asp#N5.
83. In international law, municipal courts include all courts within a country, including, within the U.S.
system, city, state, and federal courts.
84. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OFTHE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OFTHE U.S. § 522 cmt. c ("Any state
may seize a ship or aircraft on the high seas on reasonable suspicion of piracy, arrest the suspected pirates, seize
the property on board, try the suspected pirates, and impose penalties on them if convicted.").
85. See, e.g., Statute of the International Court of Justice, supra note 78, art. 38 (excluding previous
decisions of the I.C.J. from the available sources of law).
86. RSIWA, supra note 71.
87. Statute of the International Court of Justice, supra note 78, art 38, 59 stat. at 1060.
88. In exceptional circumstances, the United Nations can at times develop general principles of international
law quite rapidly, as evidenced by its various resolutions against terrorism. E.g., Human Rights and Terrorism, G.A.
Res. 160, U.N. GAOR, 56th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/56/160 (2002), at http://daccess.ods.un.org/doc/
UNDOC/GEN.NOI/487/42/PDFNoI48742.pdfOpenElement. Such rapid-fire resolutions suffer, however, from
generality, vagueness, and, in the case of terrorism, a certain circularity of definitions, making it difficult to enforce
the resolutions in any but the most blatant circumstances.
89. "Home country" is a simplification. Depending on circumstances, it might mean the country where the
defendant is domiciled, a resident, or physically present. The basic idea is that the "home country" is the country
that can, at a particular time, establish physical jurisdiction over the defendant.
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the cooperation of either the defendant or the country where his/her money or
property is located; and enforcement of equitable remedies would require the
cooperation of the defendant's home country.
For example, in a U.S. municipal court, personal jurisdiction over an alien
defendant 9° would depend on whether the defendant had "substantial contacts" with
the forum court's state. 9' If an Arizona customer purchases a defective product from
a French firm's Web site, and if the customer then brings action in an Arizona court,
the issue of personal jurisdiction would turn upon whether the French firm's volume
of business with Arizona was substantial enough to establish personal jurisdiction.
Enforcement by a municipal court would depend upon some combination of
personal custody of the defendant, cooperation of the defendant,92 and cooperation
of the defendant's home country or the country where the defendant's money or
property is located.93
The difficulties do not, however, mean that international law cannot be useful for
the Web. Certain areas of law for the Web can be based on established international
law. One clear example here is copyright law, where the Berne Convention94 has
provided a multinational framework for interpretation of copyright issues. Cases
involving parties from different countries have already established that copyright
can be extended to the Web.95 Such cases have proven that international law has a
role in the application of law to the Web.
The initial foothold in areas such as copyright might be extended into other areas,
such as contract law.96 Such law might be developed through bilateral agreements,
multilateral agreements, or U.N. resolutions. In spite of the difficulties inherent in
developing and applying international law, there can be areas where international
law is a useful tool for addressing legal issues regarding the Web.
IV. THE NATURE OF FEDERALISM
As a starting point, U.S. federalism is a fluid, dynamic, and somewhat ambiguous
concept.97 A "federal" system gives power to the various states, while a "federal"
statute takes power away from the states and exercises power by the central
government. To avoid such ambiguities within this comment, the words "federalist"

90. "Alien" in the U.S. system means a citizen of either another state or another nation.
91. "Substantial contacts" is, of course, a shorthand way of expressing the far more complex series of tests
that have evolved from Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945), and its progeny.
92. Such cooperation on the part of the defendant might be motivated, for example, by a defendant's desire
to continue doing business within the United States.
93. Such cooperation among countries is not automatic. See, e.g., Yahoo!, Inc., v. La Ligue Contre le
Racisme et L'Antisemitemisme, 169 F. Supp. 2d 1181 (N.D. Cal. 2001) (refusing to enforce an order from a French
court).
94. Universal Copyright Convention as revised at Paris on 24 July 1971, July 18, 1974, 25 U.S.T. 1341.
95. E.g., Hoepker v. Kruger, 200 F. Supp. 2d 340 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (applying Uniform Copyright Convention
to dispute between German plaintiff and U.S. co-defendant Education Broadcasting Systems for posting an allegedly
protected image to the Web).
96. This comment later suggests that it might be useful to develop a general U.N. resolution for a "bill of
rights" for Internet consumers. See infra part VIIA.
97. See, e.g., William Safire, On Language: Federalism,The Political Word that Means Its Opposite, N.Y.
TIMEs, Jan. 30, 2000, § 6 (Magazine) at 20.
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or "federalism" will refer to the system and theory of federalism, while the word
98
"federal" will refer to the central government.
Justice Brandeis famously suggested that sometimes the fact of the law is more
important than the correctness of the law, especially when various parties have come
to rely on a particular interpretation." During the same term of the Court, the same
Justice also famously suggested that a strength of federalism is that it creates room
for experimentation among the states. " The second principle's room for
experimentation creates instability and unpredictability, directly counter to the first
principle's emphasis on stability and predictability. Although contradictory, both
principles hold value for the Web.
On the one hand, a business that is considering whether to open a Web site, and
if so, how its site will operate, would benefit from having hard, established law to
factor into its consideration. An individual who likes to experiment on the Web
would benefit by knowing in advance which experiments are legally acceptable and
which are not. Potential victims of abuse might be better protected by stable law.
The above factors argue in favor of hard, established law.
On the other hand, many aspects of the Web do not yet seem ready for hard law.
Although the dissemination of child pornography across the Web is widely
condemned,' attempts to control access to pornography by minors on the Web have
run afoul of fundamental First Amendment protections. °2 Similarly, within the
environment
of an online chat room, it may not be simple to determine whether
"flaming"'' 1 3 is parody, defamation, or a harmless venting of emotion. °' These
examples suggest that there are areas where it may be beneficial to avoid hard law
and take advantage of the flexibility of experimentation.
U.S. federalism is rooted in the fact that, after the Declaration of Independence
but before the U.S. Constitution, each of the states considered itself a sovereign
nation. 105 Each state had plenary power, which it could divide and assign as it chose.

98. This approach leads to some awkwardness. "Federalist system" sounds less graceful than "federal
system." Hopefully, consistency can overcome the awkwardness.
99. Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) ("[Un most
matters it is more important that the applicable rule of law be settled than that it be settled right.").
100. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) ("It is one of the
happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory;
and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.").
101. See infra text accompanying note 160.
102. See infra part VI. From one perspective, this example might be viewed as a conflict between two sources
of hard law, federal legislation and the federal Constitution. For the purposes of this comment, though, the example
is better viewed as an illustration of a need for experimentation to determine which sort of hard legislative law,
when applied to the Web, will align with the fundamental U.S. values expressed in the Constitution.
103. Messages that abuse another user.
104. Cf Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988) (finding speech was parody and thus protected
where Hustler said Jerry Falwell had sex with his mother in an outhouse); Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44
(D.D.C. 1998) (finding speech was not protected in part because it was not parody where Matt Drudge said Sidney
Blumenthal beat his wife). On a continuum between parody and assertions of fact, it is not clear where a flame in
a chat room would fall. Most likely, the flame would not pretend to be thoroughly researched or authoritative, which
would push it toward the protections of parody. But it would probably present itself as if it were an assertion of fact,
which would push it away from those protections. Because the issue is unclear, multiple attempts at resolving it on
a fact-specific basis might uncover general principles that could then be applied to later cases.
105.

ARTICLESOFCONFEDERATION, Mar. 1, 1781. Note the distinction between confederation and federation.

There is the view that the U.S. version of sovereignty was intended to turn the English concept of
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The original states agreed to assign certain limited powers to the central
government, while retaining other powers to themselves. Of the retained powers,
some, in turn, were assigned to the counties and municipalities within each state.' °6
Early attempts at expanding the power of the central government yielded mixed
results. °7 The Civil War amendments 0 8 brought a fundamental shift toward federal
power, at the cost of state power. After initial Supreme Court rulings that seemed
to limit the scope of the Civil War amendments,"09 a series of rulings, combined with
congressional activity, expanded the power of the federal government during the
New Deal, World War II, and the Civil Rights period."' The Court has since
appeared to be limiting central authority in some areas, while expanding it in
others."1

sovereignty on its head. Rather than the English model, where sovereignty was historically rooted in the divine
infallibility of the monarch, the U.S. model in this view is rooted in the sovereign power of the people, portions of
which the people choose to assign to the state or federal governments. See, e.g., Seminole Tribe v. Fla., 517 U.S
44, 150-55 (1996) (Souter, J., dissenting); United States Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779,838-39 (1995)
(Kennedy, J., concurring).
The distinction between this sovereignty-in-the-people approach and the more traditional sovereignty-inthe-states approach has led to vigorous discussions regarding the Eleventh Amendment limits of federal jurisdiction.
See, e.g., Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S 44. The distinction also holds the possibility of interesting discussions about how
the Constitution, in more general terms, should be applied to the Web. If sovereignty is rooted in the people, then
the Constitution becomes an instrument whose primary purpose is to protect the interests of the people, which in
turn suggests an expansive view of constitutional protections offered to Web users. If, however, sovereignty is
rooted in the states, then the Constitution becomes an instrument whose primary purpose is to protect state interests
from intrusions by the federal government, which in turn suggests a more restricted view of constitutional
protections for Web users.
How this distinction might affect the development of constitutional law for the Web has the potential
of being significant, but it is beyond the scope of this comment. For the purposes of this comment, it is sufficient
that traditional U.S. jurisprudence is based on the sovereignty-in-the-states approach: states held plenary power prior
to the Constitution and assigned a portion of that power to the central U.S. government.
106. Examples are the power for counties to establish sheriffs departments and the power for municipalities
to establish real estate zoning regulations.
107. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793), asserted federal court jurisdiction over the individual
states, which quickly led to the Eleventh Amendment, denying that power. McCullough v. Md., 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.)
316 (1819), in turn, asserted a federal authority over central banks, free of state taxation, an authority that survived.
See Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824). Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515
(1832), asserted that only the federal government held authority over Indian tribes, which led to President Jackson's
apocryphal statement along the lines of "John Marshall has made his decision; now let him enforce it"(reported
with variations in various sources). See, e.g., FELIX S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 83 (1982);
GRACE STEELE WOODWARD, THE CHEROKEES 171 (1963); HORACE GREELEY, AMERICAN CONFLICT 106 (2d ed.
1867).
108. U.S. CONST. amends. XIII-XV (especially amend. XIV section 5 with its explicit grant of power to
Congress over the states).
109. E.g., Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872); Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883); Plessy
v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
110. E.g., Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619 (1937); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); Brown
v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
111. Compare Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (exercising federal jurisdiction over the traditionally state
area of evaluating election returns) with Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261 (1997) (declining to exercise
federal jurisdiction over the traditionally state area of real property law); also compare Puerto Rico Dept. of
Consumer Affairs v. Isla Petroleum Corp., 485 U.S. 495 (1988) (Scalia, J., for the majority) (declining to extend
federal preemption to decontrol petroleum prices, based on an absence of "a clear and manifest purpose" of
Congress), with Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 487 U.S. 500 (1988) (same term, Scalia, J., for the majority)
(extending federal preemption to cover civil actions related to military contracts, without congressional activity on
point).
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Still, the issue is not what the specific boundaries between state and federal power
might be at any given moment in time. Rather, the point is that the boundaries are
fluid, varying according to the subject matter, the country's needs during a particular
time period, and the inclinations of the Justices who sit on the Supreme Court.
Instead of a clear gospel, there are competing principles: states' rights versus federal
supremacy, the value of experimentation" 2 versus the need for uniformity." 3
Across all of this is the distinction between statutory law and common law. There
is little, if any, question that state courts can create common law as they see fit, in
the absence of contrary statutory provisions. "4 And although there may be "no
general federal common law,' 1' 1 there are numerous areas where federal courts can
develop common law if they choose." 6
The basic federalist system boils down to a fluid mixture of federal, state, and
municipal' " law, each of which comprises a mixture of statutory and common law.
Federal law is supreme"' where the Constitution has given power to the central
government" 9 or where the Supreme Court has found either an implied grant of
power 2 ° or an overriding need for national uniformity.'2 ' Where federal law has not
pre-empted other law, or where the federal government has explicitly granted
aspects of its power to the states or municipalities,' 22 the state or municipality creates
the law.
Within this framework, some aspects of Web law fall easily into the federal law
category. For example, the Web's underlying telecommunications infrastructure is
already regulated through federal law. 2 3 Some aspects fall clearly within the realm
of state or municipal law. 24 Other aspects are less clear.

112. See New State, 285 U.S. at 311.
113. See, e.g., Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941) (relying on a need for national uniformity in
immigration law).
114. See Erie v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
115. Id.
116. See, e.g., Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Reis, 451 U.S. 401,405-06 (1981); Textile Workers Union v.
Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 450-51 (1957).
117. "Municipal" in a domestic sense means town, city, and county.
118. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cI. 2.
119. As in the regulation of interstate commerce. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. cl. 3.
120. See, e.g., Nat'l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 858-60 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting). The
Supreme Court has relied on the Commerce Clause, as supported by the Supremacy Clause, to infer the policing
power of the dormant Commerce Clause. See id. See also U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3 (Commerce Clause); U.S.
CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (Supremacy Clause); S. Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S, 761,769 (1945) ("For a hundred years
it has been accepted constitutional doctrine that the commerce clause, without the aid of Congressional legislation,
thus affords some protection from state legislation inimical to national commerce.....); R.R. Co. v. Husen, 95 U.S.
465, 469 (1877) ("Whatever may be the power of a State over commerce that is completely internal, it can no more
prohibit or regulate that which is inter-state than it can that which is with foreign nations.").
121. See, e.g., Hines, 312 U.S. at 52 (noting need for national uniformity in immigration law).
122. See, e.g., insurance regulations. 15 U.S.C. § 1012 (granting power over insurance matters to states).
123. See, e.g., Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified in scattered parts
of 47 U.S.C.).
124. Such as business licenses for an ISP or the zoning regulations that regulate the physical structure within
which an ISP is housed.
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For example, if there is to be malpractice for Web site operators, 2 ' the
corresponding standard of care might be determined by either regional standards or
central standards. Regional standards could follow the established model for medical
malpractice and would logically fall under state law. Under the regional approach,
though, a user accessing a Web site, when deciding how much to trust the Web site,
would be unlikely to know the standard of care that applied to it, thereby making it
difficult to make an informed decision about how much personal private information
to share.
Central standards of care, on the other hand, could easily fit within federal law.
They would offer predictability to the user and uniformity across the nation.
However, they might also stifle legal innovation'26 and overburden Web site
operators in "less developed" regions.
The key point about U.S. federalism derives from its historical instability and the
imprecision of the boundaries between state and federal power. The instability and
imprecision yield flexibility. As Web law is far from mature, such flexibility may
be particularly valuable.'27
V. THE NATURE OF NON-GOVERNMENTAL "LAW"
Official bodies within the states, federal government, and international
organizations create "law" that is binding in that government will use its power to
enforce the law and coerce compliance. In a broader sense, however, "law"
encompasses more than rules, regulations, and principles that the government will
enforce; it also encompasses other norms, agreements, and standards that shape an
individual's behavior and promote a functional society. 21 In this broader sense, nongovernmental law emerges from a variety of sources, including traditions, practices,
and other more or less formal agreements among groups of people.
Non-governmental law is sometimes incorporated into formal governmental law,
such as when the U.S. Supreme Court adopted "contemporary community
standards" as part of its legal and binding definition of obscenity.' 29 At other times,
particularly in the criminal context, the prohibition against ex post facto laws
prevents retroactive governmental application of non-governmental law. 3 ' With or

125. Such malpractice may be for inadequately protecting personal private information that a user has shared.
See Thomas A. Lane, Comment, Cyber-Malpractice: Toward Tort Negligence for the Web (May 11, 2001)
(unpublished, on file with the NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW).

126. See Liebman, 285 U.S. at 311.
127. Before concluding this brief overview of the nature of U.S. federalism, it is worth noting that certain
powers have also been assigned to state and federal administrative agencies. In the area of labor-management
relations, for example, the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) has been empowered to issue decisions that
carry the full force of law. 29 U.S.C. § 156 (2000). In a practical sense, administrative law has a substantial impact
on areas as diverse as commercial aviation, the power industry, securities, and the environment. In a structural sense,
however, all of the administrative agencies derive their power from the legislatures that originally held that power.
The agencies are limited in their reach to the limits of the power of the legislatures that created them. Hence,
although the agencies provide an additional option for potential sources of Web law, their existence does not alter
the fundamental federalist structure.
128. Law in this sense resembles the modalities of regulation discussed by Lessig. I.ESSIG II, supra note 13,
at 86-90.
129. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973).
130. There is widespread disapproval of the desecration of human remains, but when the operator of a Georgia
crematorium was alleged to have severely mishandled cadavers entrusted to his care, Georgia had no statute directly
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without the power of government behind it, non-governmental law can exert
substantial influence and warrants attention in any consideration of Web law.13'
Sources of non-governmental law can be extremely informal. "Netiquette,"1 32 for
example, grew out of informal consensus among early users of email and
newsgroups.'33 Similarly, multi-user online communities began by informally
developing their internal norms of behavior; violations of those norms, in turn, have
at times led to the development of more formal procedures.' 34
Other sources of non-governmental law are more formal, more structured, more
like quasi-governments. Part Il.A of this comment, for example, discussed the
Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) and World Wide Web Consortium (W3C).
These are both structured, independent organizations with central management,
dues-paying memberships, and formal procedures for the development and adoption
of standards.
The core work of the IETF and W3C involves the development of standard
protocols; in that sense, they develop the "law" of protocols. Beyond this core work,
the bodies also address issues of how things should be done, such as the IETF
Netiquette FAQ, 135 which describes polite ways of using email and newsgroups, or
the W3C Web Content Accessibility Guidelines, 136 which provide Web site creators
with guidance for how to make their sites accessible to users with disabilities. Given
their technical expertise and the fact that they have already addressed certain
behavioral issues, bodies like the IETF and W3C may prove useful for developing
additional, more "legal-like" standards, which might then be incorporated into more
formal law, as appropriate, through reference by statute or adoption through
common law.
The American Law Institute (ALI) is another potential source of law. It resembles
the IETF and W3C in that it is an independent, non-governmental organization, but
it differs in that its primary focus is directly on areas of law, rather than areas of the
Internet or Web. ALI Restatements are, in part, useful compilations of existing law,
but they also develop and suggest new directions for law to move. The ALI can
therefore also have a role in the development of Web law, particularly in subject
matter that requires vigorous examination of existing law. While the W3C and IETF
may be well suited for developing guidelines for technical issues and general user
behavior, the ALI might be a better source for guidelines regarding the application
of bailment theory to the Web. 137

on point. Hence, the only crimes that he was charged with involved theft by deception. See CNN, Crematory
Operator Faces 100 New Counts, Feb. 27, 2002, at http://www.cnn.com/2002/LAW/O2/26/crematory
.corpseslindex.html.
131. See, e.g.,
LESsIG H,supra note 13, at 37 (discussing differing U.S. and European norms regarding
smoking).
132. The polite way of using email and newsgroups,
133. See RFC 1855: Netiquette Guidelines (IETF RFC 1995) at http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfcl855.txt?
number=-1855.

134. See LESSIG H,supra note 13, at 74-78 (describing how a multi-user community developed mechanisms
of government in response to several "cyber-rapes").
135. See supra note 133.
136. At http://www.w3.orgTR/WAI-WEBCONTENT/(May 5,1999).
137. An additional option would be for legal organizations such as the ALl to collaborate with technical
organizations such as the W3C and IETF.
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As Lessig points out, there is, in addition to the above non-governmental sources,
the code of the Web itself-the protocols and programs that enable the Web to
operate. 138 If written one way, the code can permit certain behaviors; if written
differently, the code can constrain those behaviors. 39 Such "west coast code"'4
affects online behavior more directly than traditional law, in that the code
proactively enables or disables capabilities rather than creating after-the-fact
consequences.' 4
At the same time, however, the development, implementation, and use of the code
is itself subject to legal restraints. 4 2 The code is both a source of regulation of user
behavior and an object that law controls. Hence, even while exerting its own
influence, the code itself is subject to the various governmental and nongovernmental sources of law discussed in this comment.
VI. A CASE IN POINT: THE CPPA
The main thesis of this comment is that the U.S. federalist system is well suited
to the application of law to the Web because the system offers a diversity of legal
tools to address a diversity of Web needs. Implicit in this thesis is the concept that
some tools are better for certain jobs than others. The recent U.S. Supreme Court43
ruling on the constitutionality of the Child Pornography Prevention Act (CPPA)
demonstrates that federal statutory law, while it has its place, is not always the most
appropriate source of law to use for the Web.
When an issue is "hot," legislators at the various levels of government will seek
to address it by statute. In the 1980s, Texas had a state statute forbidding flag
burning.'" In 1989, the U.S. Supreme Court found that statute to violate the First
Amendment. 14 5 Flag burning became a hot issue, and before the year was finished,
the U.S. Congress responded with the Flag Protection Act of 1989.' 4 The following
year, the Supreme Court rejected that act as well. 47 Although Congress continues

138. LESSIG II, supra note 13, at 20-21.

139. For example, untraceable anonymity permits users to speak without fear of identification, which in turn
can encourage whistle-blowers or people who wish to discuss particularly sensitive personal issues, such as AIDS
or sexual abuse. See supra note 54. Code written differently, though, could eliminate the possibility of untraceable
anonymity, which in turn would discourage those same discussions.
140. "West coast code" is Lessig's phrase, to distinguish it from "east coast code," the statutory code written
in Washington, D.C. LESSIG II, supra note 13, at 53-54.
141. Even an injunction is only enforced through consequences that occur after the fact of a violation of the
injunction.
142. See, e.g., COMPUTER SCIENCE AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS BOARD, NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL.,
supra note 33 (discussing the export controls applied to encryption software); supra note 35 and accompanying text

(discussing the applicability of copyright law to software).
143. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 122 S. Ct. 1389, 1406 (2002) (deciding constitutionality of Child
Pornography Prevention Act, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-28 (1996) (codified in scattered sections of 18
U.S.C.)).
144. TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 4209 (1989) ("A person commits an offense if he intentionally or knowingly
desecrates... a state or national flag.").
145. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 418 (1989).
146. Pub. L. No. 101-131, 103 Stat. 777 (1989).
147. United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, 318 (1990).
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to introduce proposals to ban flag burning, the issue no longer galvanizes public
opinion to the same degree, and no proposal has passed both houses since 1989.Y'
As interest in flag burning has waned, interest in protecting children from the
perceived dangers of the Web has waxed. In 1996, Congress passed the
Communications Decency Act (CDA), 4 9 which sought to restrict access by minors
to "indecent" materials on the Web; in 1997, the Supreme Court struck down much
of the CDA on First Amendment grounds. 5 ' Also in 1996, Congress passed the
Child Pornography Prevention Act (CPPA),'5 ' which, among other things, sought
to criminalize the creation, distribution, and possession of "virtual child
pornography."' 5 2 In 2002, again on First Amendment grounds, the Court struck
down provisions of the CPPA that did not involve actual child actors. 5 3 In 1999,
Congress adopted the Child Online Protection Act (COPA), 5 4 which sought to
overcome the constitutional defects of the CDA. Although the COPA has not yet
been tested before the Supreme Court, its constitutionality is suspect.' 55 In each case,
legislators were responding to a hot topic. In both of the cases decided so far, the
legislators were found to have overstepped their authority.
This is not meant to suggest that Congress does not have a role in addressing
Web-related issues. Among the parts of the above-mentioned acts that have survived
constitutional scrutiny are the key CPPA provisions that deal with pornography
involving actual child actors.' 56 But in those areas where Congress's actions were
struck down by the Court, the actions were not only unconstitutional but also
arguably unwise 57 or, from the perspective of this comment, simply an application
of the wrong tool.
The CPPA's ban on virtual child pornography is a case in point. Three JusticesO'Connor, Rehnquist, and Scalia-would have read the statute narrowly, restricting
the interpretation of the language to "images that are virtually indistinguishable from
actual children."'5 8 A fourth Justice-Thomas-while concurring in the judgment,
raised the possibility that the technology of computer-generated images might
evolve to the point that "it becomes impossible to.. .prove that certain pornographic
images are of real children,"' 59 in which case the issue would warrant revisiting for

148. See Michael J.Davidson, The Flag, the First Amendment, and the Military, 2001 ARMY LAW. 1, 1-2
(giving an overview of congressional activity regarding flag burning).
149. Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 133 (1996).
150. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
151. Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996).
152. In general terms, virtual child pornography involves simulated images of children. For example,
computer-generated manipulations can be used to take an image of a youthful-looking adult engaged in sex and
place a child's face on the adult's body.
153. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 122 S.Ct. 1389 (2002).
154. Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681 (1999).
supra note 13, at 177. Ashcroft v. ACLU, 122 S.Ct. 1700 (2002), addressed the standards to
155. LESsIG I1,
apply to determine the constitutionality of the COPA, but it did not address the underlying constitutionality itself.
156. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2251(c) (2000) (covering the transmission of actual child pornography by
computer). The Court thereby kept the underlying rationale, based on actual exploitation of children, of New York
v. Ferber,458 U.S. 747, 756-57 (1982).
supra note 13, at 174-75.
157. LESSIG I],
158. Free Speech Coalition, 122 S.Ct. at 1409 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in
part).
concurring in judgment).
159. Id. at 1406 (Thomas, J.,
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law-enforcement reasons. The majority itself recognized that "sexual abuse of a
child is 'a16most
serious crime and an act repugnant to the moral instincts of a decent
0

people."

This creates the backdrop of a Supreme Court that unanimously condemns the
sexual abuse of a child. No Justice took issue with the prohibition against the
distribution of actual child pornography.
The only dissents regarded the boundaries
6
of what constitutes pornography.' 1
The first prong for upholding the prohibition of the distribution of actual child
pornography came from New York v. Ferber,162 that actual child pornography
"created a permanent record of a child's abuse, [and]... each new publication...
would cause new injury to the child's reputation and emotional well-being."' 63 This
prong, in turn, can be separated into two components: the original harm to the child
and the ongoing harm to the child's reputation and emotions. Even if the child
him/herself does not suffer the original abuse, a "virtual image" of sufficient
technical quality could cause the ongoing harm. "6
For three Justices, a "virtually indistinguishable" image would already be outside
the reach of First Amendment protections. 6 1 For a fourth, a virtual image of higher
technical quality than is currently possible might fall outside the First Amendment
protections. "6For the remaining Justices, one component of their rationale for not
protecting actual child pornography-the ongoing harm-provides a strong
argument for not protecting virtual child pornography. As technology advances, the
ongoing harm component of the underlying rationale becomes stronger.
Given the current state of technology and the broad wording of the CPPA, Free
Speech Coalition was correctly decided. It does not seem, however, to be a
particularly stable decision. Instead, it seems more like a holding action, a means of
buying time until the issues regarding virtual child pornography can be more clearly
resolved.
The defamation-like aspects of the ongoing harm to a child do not yet seem ripe
for federal legislation, particularly since defamation is not traditionally an area of
federal law. This seems to be an area where, if Congress would restrain itself from
acting, the various states could experiment, and the various courts could evaluate
detailed fact patterns, be informed by each other's decisions, and eventually grow
toward something resembling consensus. When that is reached, Congress could
centralize the law on the basis of experience, as opposed to simply responding to
political pressure.
There are ways of developing law that exploit the strengths of the various
governments and courts, and there are short cuts that lead to constitutional
violations. The federal statutory ban on virtual child pornography in the CPPA was

160. Id. at 1399.
161. Or, in the case of Justice Thomas, what level of proof law enforcement must meet in order to
demonstrate child abuse.
162. 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
163. Free Speech Coalition, 122 S. Ct. at 1401.
164. Note, however, that for virtual child pornography, based as it is on a lie, there may be state actions
available for defamation and/or infliction of emotional distress.
165. Supra text accompanying note 158.
166. Supra text accompanying note 159.
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a short cut. Certain tools are better for certain jobs than are other tools: a hammer
can break a board, but a saw leaves a smoother cut.
VII. PRELIMINARY SUGGESTIONS
Even though this comment is limited in scope, it would seem incomplete without
an attempt to offer some practical suggestions. The tools have been examined and
their general uses described. One Supreme Court ruling has been evaluated to shed
light on one tool, federal statutory law, succeeding in one application but failing in
another. What is left is to suggest a few ways that the variety of tools might be
usefully applied to the diversity of issues raised by the Web.
A. A Role for InternationalLaw
Given the general unwieldiness of international law, it seems a poor tool for
addressing cutting-edge issues. It can, however, be a good choice for addressing
large-scale issues of multinational import, particularly if new law can be based on
existing international law.
As previously mentioned, international copyright law has already evolved to the
point where it can, in many cases, be easily adapted to the context of the Web.'6 7
Similar straightforward adaptations may also be available for other types of
intellectual property law, including patent and trademark, at least to the extent that
they have already been clarified under agreements such as the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).' Copyright, patent, and trademark meet all three of
the basic criteria: they are large-scale issues, they have multinational import, and
they are areas where international law that can be adapted has already been
developed.
Contract law can, in some instances, meet the first two criteria: it is a large-scale
issue with multinational import. Contract law itself, however, does not seem to have
been extensively developed at the international level. There are some contract-like
issues addressed in agreements such as the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA), 6 9 but the more promising approach seems to be for parties to a contract,
particularly sophisticated parties to a large contract, to continue to insert clauses that
specify which municipal law will apply and which municipal court will have
jurisdiction. 7 °
Beyond that, particularly for smaller transactions such as small purchases of
books or music CDs, there may be a limited role for international law. It might be

possible to develop a general UN resolution for a "bill of rights" for Internet
consumers. Details, though, would fall back on municipal law. To the extent that
municipal law cannot practicably be enforced, law regarding small international
transactions likely needs to fall back on the old principle of caveat emptor.

167. Supra notes 94-95 and accompanying text.
168. Dec. 15, 1993, 33 I.L.M. 1.
169. Canada-Mexico-United States: North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 8, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 605.
170. See, e.g., M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 12 (1972) (enforcing a forum-selection
clause specifying the London Court of Justice in a contract between an American company and a German company,
in part because "[tihe choice of that forum was made in an arm's length negotiation by experienced and
sophisticated businessmen").
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In the area of criminal law, two subjects that international law might address are
the use of the Internet to facilitate terrorism and the distribution of child
pornography. Both have general UN resolutions to support them at the level of
international law."' Both, however, are rooted in physical events that occur in a
geographical place-the actual terrorist act or the actual abuse of the child. Both, in
turn, although frequently involving cooperation among law enforcement agencies
72
in multiple countries, fall back onto municipal law for actual prosecutions. 1
This suggests a variation on the theme of international law that might have
general applicability to Web law. First, a basic agreement is reached at the
international level, which is true of the Berne Convention, GATT, terrorism, and
child pornography, and which would be true of a general Internet consumers' bill
of rights. Second, each participating country adopts internal laws to implement the
basic agreement. Third, the basic agreement gives the various law enforcement
agencies the ability to collaborate across national boundaries. And finally, the actual
litigation occurs under the local law of the country where the court with jurisdiction
sits.
All of the areas suggested above involve large-scale issues with multinational
import, and all except contract law involve established international law that can be
adapted to the Web. All can further be implemented through the pattern of general
international agreements, local implementing legislation, multinational cooperation
among law enforcement agencies, and final litigation under local law. They stand,
then, as examples of the types of areas where the application of international law can
benefit the Web.
B. A Role for FederalLaw
Although state and federal law were treated concurrently in the discussion of the
nature of federalism,'73 they will now be treated separately. Concurrent treatment is
helpful when discussing the philosophical and theoretical underpinnings of
federalism. When discussing practical application, however, separate treatment of
federal and state law becomes more helpful.
As a starting point, all federal authority is limited by the U.S. Constitution, as
interpreted by the U.S. Supreme Court. Regardless of how beneficial federal law
might be for a particular subject, unless it falls within the fluctuating outer boundaries set by interpretation of the Constitution, it is not valid and cannot be used.
A second constraint is that the Constitution grants a potential for power, but until
that power is exercised by Congress, both the courts and the executive branch are
generally prohibited from exercising it.'74 For the purposes of this comment, this
constraint primarily affects the exercise of federal common law by the courts. By its
171. See, e.g., Human Rights and Terrorism, G.A. Res. 160, U.N. GAOR, 56th Sess. at 2, U.N. Doe.
A/RES/56/160 (2002); Optional Protocols to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of
Children in Armed Conflict and of the Sale of Children,Child Prostitution,and Child Pornography,G.A. Res. 263,
U.N. GAOR, 54th Sess., U.N. Doc A/RES/54/263 (2000).
172. See, e.g., supra note 51 (dealing with international cooperation among law enforcement agencies, with
resulting prosecutions under each arresting country's laws).
173. See supra part IV.
174. One exception to this general statement involves the areas that are unambiguously and exclusively
assigned to the federal government, such as the power to make treaties. U.S. CONST. art. 2, § 2, cl. 2.
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very nature, the Web involves interstate and international communications, all
including a commercial component.' 75 Web regulation is easily brought within the
broad parameters of the interstate commerce clause.'76 Hence, the scope of
regulation that Congress could theoretically impose on the Web' is extremely
large.
The federal courts, however, cannot exercise federal common law over the entire
Web; they are limited to the regions, or closely related regions, that Congress has
addressed. For example, federal common law can address the interstices in the
federal civil causes of action related to hacking into protected computers,' 78 but
federal common law cannot extend such civil causes of action beyond those
enumerated in the statute.
Within these constraints, there are numerous areas where federal law might be
useful for the Web. First, federal law is necessary in areas where Congress has
already preempted state power. Second, federal law is useful in areas where national
conformity in law is valued.' 79 Third, federal law is necessary in those areas-over
which the Constitution has given exclusive power to the federal government. And
finally, federal law will tend to be more reasonable if a national consensus has
already emerged about what reasonable law would be, not infrequently through
permitting the states to perform their process of experimentation for long enough for
a consensus to ripen.
Examples of areas where Congress has already exercised power include the
regulation of the telecommunications infrastructure underlying the Web 8 ° and the
criminalization of hacking into federally protected computers"' or using the Web
to distribute actual child pornography. 82 A less obvious example involves
employment practices. No one had the Web in mind when originally developing
federal law regulating employment practices.' 83 But the Web can be used to establish
employment contracts, various types of work can be performed across the Web, and
any type of work product that can be fixed in electronic media can be transmitted
across the Web. Hence, if an employment relationship would otherwise be covered
by federal law in a non-electronic environment, and if the only variation on that
relationship is that it is Web based, then the same federal law will still apply to the
Web. Congress historically exercising power in a non-electronic environment
thereby creates an exercise of power over a region of the emerging electronic

175.

Even a "free" Web site is built upon a series of commercial transactions, many of which are interstate

in character, ranging from the construction of the various computers to the provision of the communications links.
176. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
177. At least within national boundaries.
178. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(g) (2000) provides for a federal civil cause of action under the section only if one of
six specific factors is met.
179. An apt analogy is to immigration law and treaty implementations. See, e.g., supra note 113, infra notes
184 and 185.

180. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified in scattered parts of 47
U.S.C.).
181.

18 U.S.C. § 1030(g) (2000).

182. Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 133 (1996).
183. E.g., Civil Rights Act of 1964, 88 Pub. L. No. 352, 78 Stat. 241, 253-66 (1964) (codified as amended
at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2000)).

Winter 2003]

FEDERALISM AND THE WEB

environment. Along with the exercise of power comes the pre-Web federal common
law that was developed to fill the interstices in statutory law.' 84
Beyond the areas where federal law has in fact already preempted state law, there
are areas where new federal law can be useful to promote the goal of national
consistency. Sometimes national consistency is compelled by practical
considerations. 85 At other times, though not compelled, national consistency
becomes desirable as a reflection of an emerging national consensus.'86
A promising area of federal work, based upon an emerging national consensus,
involves federal protection of privacy on the Web. Privacy is often referred to as a
"right," but there is no express right of privacy in the Constitution. The various
Supreme Court decisions that have found something resembling a right to privacy
have been less than thorough in their explanation of its source and parameters.' 87
Still, there is a broad expectation of privacy among U.S. citizens and a general
perception that it is a right.' 88
Given the consensus that privacy should be protected and the fact that the federal
government has the authority to regulate the Web, the protection of privacy is an
area where federal law is a good tool to apply to the Web. The federal government
has responded with several initiatives, leading, for example, to a series of
informative reports.' 89 Congress, in its turn, has enacted certain privacy protections
in legislation such as the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 (ECPA) 9 °

184. This follows the pattern established in Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
185. See, e.g., Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 487 U.S. 500 (1988) (applying national consistency for
military contracts); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941) (applying national consistency in immigration law).
186. In this context, the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17, can be viewed as the
larger part of the nation imposing its emerging consensus regarding race relations upon a dissenting region of the
nation. Similarly, the CPPA prohibition against using the Web to distribute actual child pornography is an example
of federal law reflecting national consensus. The suppression of child pornography is not necessary for the
government to function effectively, but consensus condemns child pornography. The dispute regarding virtual child
pornography, conversely, reflects a lack of consensus about what the reach of the prohibition should be.
187. The popular formulation of privacy being part of a "penumbra" of constitutional rights, as expressed in
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483 (1965), has since been abandoned by the Court. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113, 152-153 (1973). (A "penumbra" of statutory protections, in contrast, seems to remain. Complete Auto Transit,
Inc. v. Reis, 451 U.S. 401, 406 (1981) (quoting Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 457 (1957)).
Current Supreme Court reasoning seems to root privacy in the Fourteenth Amendment's concept of personal liberty
and restrictions upon state actions, Roe, 410 U.S. at 153, though that approach suffers from the limitations that
Fourteenth Amendment equal protection extends only to state actions, that Fifth Amendment due process-based
equal protection against federal actions is implied rather than express, and that neither the Fourteenth nor the Fifth
Amendment provides protection against private actions. It may also be that the true root of the right can be found
among the unenumerated rights of the Ninth Amendment, see, e.g., Griswold, 381 U.S. at 486 (Goldberg, J.,
concurring), or the powers reserved to the people in the Tenth Amendment. Whatever its roots, and whatever its
validity as an actual constitutional right, privacy is an expectation of the U.S. populace that has become so valued
that it resembles a constitutional right. It is "right-like." Regardless of the independent status of privacy as a
constitutional right, however, Congress, under the interstate commerce clause, has ample power to create a statutory
right to privacy on the Web and to protect it against any actors, governmental or private, who might intrude into
it.
188.

Cf., WINSTON S. CHURCHILL, A HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH SPEAKING PEOPLE: THE BIRTH OF BRITAIN

60 (1958) (Of King Arthur: "It is all true, or it ought to be; and more and better besides.").
189. E.g., Federal Trade Commission, Privacy Online: A Report to Congress (June 1998), at
http://www.ftc.gov/reports/privacy3/toc.htm; Federal Trade Commission, Staff Report: Public Workshop on
Consumer Privacy on the Global Information Infrastructure (Dec. 1996) available at http://www.ftc.gov/reports/
privacy/privacy 1.htm; U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Privacy and the NIl: Safeguarding Telecommunications-Related
Personal Information (Oct. 1995), at http://www.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/privwhitepaper.html.
190. Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 (codified in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.) (protecting against
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and the Child Online Protection Act of 1986 (COPA).' 9' These acts do not yet reach
issues such as Web sites that collect semi-sensitive personal information1 9 and then
pass that information on to marketing firms, but the federal action to date is a
promising move toward a more thorough protection of privacy. Such protection
1 93
would serve the goal of national consistency and reflect a general consensus.
Another area where federal law might be useful is contracts. Although contracts,
per se, generally fall under state law, interstate contracts fall within the potential
power of the interstate commerce clause. Law for Web-based contracts would
benefit from national uniformity, in that both consumers and providers would have
more consistent expectations. Furthermore, the Uniform Commercial Code has been
adopted by the various states to a sufficient degree that a large area of consensus has
emerged.94

In the area of Web contracts, federal law should not attempt to be overly
comprehensive. Too much detail would lead to competing and potentially
conflicting bodies of law--one federal for Web contracts, the other state for nonWeb contracts-which could in turn lead to all of the difficulties created by Swift
v. Tyson.'95 This factor counsels restraint and a certain generality about federal
contract law.
Nor should federal law interfere with the ability of sophisticated parties on a
relatively equal footing to choose the law that should govern large-scale contracts.
Choice of law is one of the issues that such parties negotiate, and as their agreed
upon choice is factored into the value and expectations of the contract, so should
their choice be respected. This consideration counsels a federal focus on small-scale
transactions where one of the parties may be less sophisticated than the other.
The result of these considerations parallels the suggestion for potential
international law: a bill of rights for Web consumers. If an international bill of rights
could be established quickly enough, the federal law could be used to implement it
consistently throughout the states. Otherwise, a consistent federal law might provide
both an interim continuity among the states and a basis for future international
negotiations. Either way, a general federal law would provide the benefit of national
uniformity without interfering with the states' ability to experiment with the
details. 9' 6

unauthorized access to electronic communications).
191. Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681-736 (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 231 (2000)) (protecting, among other
things, the privacy of information collected to determine whether a user is an adult).
192. Such as email addresses and phone numbers.
193. At least among users of the Web, if not among those who seek to profit by the sale of others' personal
information.
194. For example, the Uniform Commercial Code Locator at Cornell University links to statutes from 49
states and the District of Columbia that correspond to U.C.C. Article 1. At http://www.law.comell.edu/
uniformlucc.html (July 5, 2000).
195. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842), overruled by Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
196. If general federal statutory contract law for the Web were established, the ability of the states to continue
to experiment with the details might rely on the wording and construction of a saving clause within that legislation.
In Pilot Life Insurance Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41 (1987), for example, the Supreme Court found that the saving
clause in the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829, § 514(b)(2)(A)
(codified at 29 U.S.C. § I 144(b)(2)(A) (2000)), was insufficient to preserve a state action for improper processing
of disability claims. The power of the courts to extend federal preemption even in the face of a saving clause
suggests that any such clause in a federal statute for Web contracts must be explicit and unequivocal in its

Winter 2003]

FEDERALISM AND THE WEB

Federal law might also be helpful in addressing tort negligence on the Web."'
Admittedly, torts are traditionally an area left to the states, and the bulk of the body
of tort law that currently exists was developed by the states. Furthermore, no
consensus about the issue seems to have emerged. Indeed, except for a few academic
articles, the question of whether tort negligence can even be applied in a Web
context has barely been discussed.'98
Nevertheless, the potential benefits of addressing negligence at the federal level
are compelling. Users would have a consistent set of expectations, and providers
would know what was expected of them. When an unintentional harm occurred, the
victim, the tortfeasor, and the courts would all be spared the complexities of
choosing among competing bodies of law. A single law would apply, at least within
national boundaries. Consistent expectations would then promote better informed
behaviors on the part of both users and providers.
Such law could be constructed in a manner that would permit flexibility in the
face of technological evolution. A general statute could federalize the issue of tort
negligence for ISPs. The definition of a reasonable standard of care could be left to
subject matter experts (SMEs) such as the W3C. The proper application of the
combination of federal statute and SME standards could be left to federal common
law. 199
The above examples illustrate areas where federal law has already addressed Web
issues with success and areas where federal law holds promise for the Web issues.
There remain, however, the constraints. Federal statutory law cannot exceed the
broad limits set by the Constitution, and federal common law cannot exceed the
narrower limits of the scope of power that Congress has chosen to exercise. 200
Within these constraints, it is generally preferable to restrict federal law to areas
where a national consensus has emerged,2 °' though20 2at times the value of national
consistency overrides the desirability of consensus.
C. A Role for State Law
Given the plenary nature of state power, state law should be applied to all areas
that require formal, governmental law and that have not yet been addressed by
international or federal law. The inclusionary aspect of this formulation-all areas
that require formal, governmental law-encompasses areas of law that have
traditionally been within state power, unsettled areas that could benefit from

preservation of state powers.
197. Negligence could address either the failure to adequately protect sensitive information. Lane, supra note
125, at 5, or the failure to adequately protect a computer from hacking, thereby enabling others to use it as a base
for attacks against other computers. See, e.g., Stephen E. Henderson & Matthew E. Yarbrough, Suing the Insecure?:
A Duty of Care in Cyberspace, 32 N.M. L. REv. 11 (2002); David L. Gripman, The Doors Are Locked but the
Thieves and Vandals Are Still Getting in: A Proposal in Tort to Alleviate CorporateAmerica's Cyber-Crime

Problem, 16 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 167 (1997).
198. See supra note 197.
199. This specific approach to federalizing tort negligence for ISPs by combining law from various sources
is discussed further in part VIE of this comment.
200. The Constitution defines the limits of the field; congressional action determines how much of that field
the federal government has occupied.
201. See, e.g., supra note 186 and accompanying text.
202. Id.
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experimentation, and whatever other areas that might fall into the gaps within
existing law.2" 3 The exclusionary aspect of this formulation has already been
addressed in the two preceding sections of this comment.
This comment has already suggested that state law is the appropriate tool for
addressing virtual child pornography. Any state treatment of this issue will be
subject to the same First Amendment constraints as were applied in Free Speech
Coalition.2 ° The constitutional flaw that the majority found in that case was that the
particular wording in the CPPA regarding virtual child pornography was overly
broad. The key to overcoming that deficiency is to develop wording that is
sufficiently narrow to meet the First Amendment requirements. An ideal way to
develop that wording would be through experimentation-multiple states enacting
multiple statutes with multiple variations of wording, each of which can be tested
in turn by various courts. °5
State law should also address any issues related to hacking" ° into individual
users' computers that federal law has not specifically preempted. Logically, an
individual's computer is a form of personal property. When that computer is linked
to the Web, its resources become a "site" within the Web, leading to a cyber-variant
of real property. 7 These analogies lead to unauthorized access to a computer being
a form of trespass 0 8 and unauthorized use of a computer being a form of
conversion. 0 9 Both trespass and conversion are traditional areas of state law, and
because of the relative newness of applying them to the Web, trespass and
conversion are good candidates for state experimentation.
The federal Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA),2 '0 as revised, is extremely
expansive in scope in terms of the computers it covers. With language extending its
protections to any computer "used in interstate or foreign commerce or
communication," 21t the CFAA can be read to cover any computer that connects to
the Web. The types of unauthorized access and use that it criminalizes are, however,
specifically defined, and the CFAA contains no preemption clause. Absent express
preemption, state law remains intact insofar as it does not directly contradict the

203. The inclusionary aspect itself contains an exclusionary element-the need for governmental law to be
required. Any formal law will only cause disruption if it is extended into areas where it is not needed, such as, for
example, the detailed specification of technical protocols.
204. 122 S. Ct. at 1399.
205. In addition to statutory criminal law, the states can explore the civil tort of defamation as a potential path
for developing a formulation of law that would be held constitutional.
206. "Hacking" here is used in a broad sense to include both active attacks, where the hacker is interactively
seeking unauthorized access to a computer, and passive attacks, where the hacker sends out a virus or worm that
automatically gains access and replicates itself.
207. Geocities, following this analogy, previously referred to those who create Web pages on its computers
as "homesteaders." Although Geocities now refers to its members as "members," a relic of the old terminology can
be found in the URL for its "Welcome, Guest" page at http://geocities.yahoo.com/homestead/file-manager.html
(last visited Jan. 9, 2003).
208. An alternate path to reach the same conclusion is to view unauthorized access as trespass to chattels. See,
e.g., AOL, Inc. v. Nat'l Health Care Disc., Inc., 121 F. Supp. 2d 1255, 1277 (N.D. Iowa 2000) (finding that, under
Virginia common law, trespass to chattels can be applied to unauthorized access to computer systems).
209. See, e.g., id. (discussing conversion in the trespass to chattels analysis).
210. 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2000).
211. Id. § 1030(e)(2)(B).

Winter 2003]

FEDERALISM AND THE WEB

federal law.21 2 States are therefore free to complement the CFAA protections
through state statutory and common law.2t3
Although this comment argues that tort negligence by ISPs should be a federal
issue, 214 many other civil causes of action remain better left to the states. Trespass
and conversion have already been addressed; other examples include defamation,
infliction of emotional distress, and loss of consortium. All are traditionally areas
of state law; none, in the context of the Web, has a compelling need for national
consistency 2 5" or a clear national consensus.216 In addition, as this comment has
already argued," 7 state law seems the best choice for resolving the details of contract
law in the Web context.
Even with the broad formulation that state law should be applied to all areas that
require formal, governmental law and that have not yet been addressed by federal
or international law, there is still the restriction that formal law be required. The
examples given above are all areas where formal law steps in when more or less
informal self-regulation fails. There remain, however, areas where the Web should
be left unconstrained by any governmental law.
D. A Role for Non-Governmental Law
Non-governmental "law" can cover all areas that do not require a governmental
power to enforce. This includes, in fact, the vast majority of technical issues and
user behavior. While deliberate defamation is a subject where formal law is, at
times, appropriate, 1 8 inadvertent spamming2t9 is better left to informal mechanisms
such as user education.

212. See, e.g., Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 208 (1985) (discussing the threshold question
of whether Congress intended preemption). The requirement that state law not contradict the federal law is due to
the Supremacy Clause. States can supplement federal prohibitions, but they cannot constitutionally legalize a
federally proscribed activity.
213. See, e.g., Nat'l Health Care Disc., 121 F. Supp. 2d at 1271-1276, 1276-1277, 1277-1279 (allowing
AOL's claims to proceed to trial concurrently under the CFAA, Virginia statute, and Virginia common law,
respectively).
214. See supra part VII.B.
215. One exception to the lack of a need for national consistency is that all state law remains subject to the
constraints of the Constitution. Defamation law, for example, regardless of whether it is used in a Web context,
remains constrained by the First Amendment. See, e.g., Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988).
216. As a further consideration, several of the torts that this comment argues should be left to the statestrespass, conversion, and defamation, in particular-involve intentional tortfeasors. The operation of law has
numerous inherent biases in favor of one party or another, such as presumptions in choice of forum or choice of law.
In general, the greater the tortfeasor's intent, the more those biases should be shifted in favor of the victim. Cf.
Andrew G. Schultz & M.E. Occhialino, Statutory Adoption of Several Liability in New Mexico: A Commentary and
Quasi-Legislative History, 18 N.M. L. REv. 483, 488 (1988) ("(1) The moral culpability of an intentional
wrongdoer's conduct is significantly greater than that of a negligent actor; and (2) The difference justifies the
conclusion that the intentional wrongdoer forfeits his right to the equitable principle of apportionment of liability
based on fault."). An unintentionally negligent ISP is more entitled to biases such as consistent national standards
of care, since potential exposure to varying standards of care will tend to suppress the ISP's willingness to
participate in the Web. An intentional hacker, however, is less entitled to biases in his/her favor, since knowingly
causing harm is less deserving of protection than unknowingly permitting harm to occur. The victim of an
intentional tortfeasor should therefore be more entitled to whatever advantages can be found in choice of forum,
choice among various states' law, and other sources of bias.
217. See supra part VII.B.
218. See, e.g., supra notes 104 and 215 and accompanying text.
219. Such as when an email user accidentally replies to all rather than simply replying to the sender.
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In addition to the constitutional and structural constraints on formal law discussed
previously, there are certain practical constraints. For one, lawsuits are expensive.
Even if formal law creates a right, it would not be affordable for an individual to
bring a formal suit to enforce that right unless the damage was significant enough
and the probability of recovery high enough.22 For small harms where suits are
impracticable, non-governmental mechanisms are the appropriate tool for protecting
individuals' interests.22'
A second practical constraint on governmental law is that the various officials
who make such law are not generally experts in the technical side of the Web.
Legislators and judges are not the appropriate groups to be debating the relative
merits of assigning different meanings to the second four bits in an Internet Protocol
version 6 packet. 22 2 Such technical issues are best left to the organizations of SMEs
that specialize
in developing the technical specifications, such as the IETF and
2 23
W3C.

An additional practical constraint on governmental law is that it tends to evolve
slowly. Statutory law can take years to develop.224 Common law does not develop
until a suit is brought and decided, and the common law does not become final for
stare decisis purposes until the suit has been appealed to, accepted by, and decided
by the highest court for the subject matter.225
As a result of this slowness of governmental law, issues for which solutions need
to evolve quickly should be left to non-governmental sources. One example already
discussed in this comment is the specific issue of a reasonable standard of care for
ISPs in protecting sensitive information.226 Another example lies in encouraging
organizations such as the ALI to collaborate with SMEs in adapting existing
documents such as Restatements to the Web.227
Within this general framework, non-governmental entities need to realize that, if
they do not effectively address issues that matter to users, there will be increased
220. Similarly, a class action based on small harms could not be practicably brought unless a sufficient

number of individuals suffered similar harms.
221. For example, if a member of a newsgroup misuses that group by posting inappropriate messages, the
manager of the newsgroup can protect the group's interests by removing the individual's permission to post

messages to the group.
222. See RFC 1883: Internet Protocol, Version 6 (IPv6) Specification, 3. IPv6 Header Format (IETF RFC
1995), at http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc I883.txt.
223. The government does sponsor groups such as the National Institute of Science and Technology (NIST)

that develop technical specifications that are applicable to the Web. See, e.g., Advanced Encryption Standard Home
Page at http://csrc.nist.gov/encryption/aes/ (last updated Dec. 4, 2001). Specifications from these groups are
governmental, in the sense that government sponsors the groups. The specifications are not, however, formal law,
in that adherence by non-federal groups is voluntary.
224. For example, at first blush, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L No. 107-204 (2002), might appear

to be a rapid governmental response to the Enron and Worldcom scandals of spring 2002. In fact, the Act's
development can be traced back at least as far as 1996. See United States General Accounting Office, The
Accounting Profession, Major Issues: Progress and Concerns (Sept. 1996), at http://www.access.gpo.gov/

sudocs/aces/aces 160.shtml.
225. The U.S. Supreme Court for federal issues, state supreme courts for state issues.
226. See supra text accompanying notes 197-199.
227. Adapting existing Restatements to the Web seems preferable to any attempt to develop a separate body

of Web law. For example, the fundamental elements of a contract remain the same regardless of whether it is
executed face-to-face, through the mail, or online. It therefore seems that the bulk of the extension of existing
secondary sources to address the Web can be handled through revised commentary, rather than through revisions
to the underlying rules.
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pressure for governmental agencies to intervene and apply formal law. To the degree
that non-governmental entities fail to counter offensive or abusive online behavior,
there will be motivation for the government to intrude. Hence, a warning: to the
extent that the Web community does not wish to be constrained by formal law, it
must self-regulate.
E. A Role for Hybrids
A common thread running through many of the above examples is the idea that
Web law might benefit from the integrated application of different types of law.
International law can condemn child pornography, federal law can criminalize actual
child pornography, and the states can experiment with approaches to virtual child
pornography. A general Internet consumers' bill of rights can be established at the
international or federal level, and the states can fill in the details.
A promising area for the application of such hybridized, integrated law lies in tort
negligence for ISPs. On the one hand, there are strong reasons to have nationally
uniform law, including consistency of expectations among users and a consistent
understanding of duty among providers. Legislatures and courts, however, are not
well suited to evaluating the technical details of a particular Web site's security
configuration.
A hybridized approach could begin with a federal statute that federalized the
general issue of tort negligence for ISPs and preempted states from addressing the
issue. Details, such as the definition of a reasonable standard of care, would be
incorporated, by reference, from work products of SMEs such as the W3C.228 As the
SMEs revised their standards to reflect technological change, so would the federal
law evolve, without the need for additional action by Congress. The mechanisms for
applying the combination of federal statute and SME standards could be left to
federal common law. Consistency would come from the federalization of the issue,
flexibility would come from the delegation of details to the SMEs, and practicality
would come from the courts deciding the controversies that arose on a fact-specific
basis.
The mixture of different levels of detail from different sources of law adds to the
overall flexibility of the U.S. federalist system. By increasing the flexibility, the
possibility of mixing law from different sources can only add to the potential
effectiveness of the application of law to the Web.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The U.S. federalist scheme is sufficiently flexible to accommodate law from
multiple sources, including international, federal, state, and non-governmental
sources. The boundaries between these sources are fluid. Yesterday's customary
practice can become today's state common law, which can in turn become
tomorrow's federal statutory law.

228. Subject to Learned Hand's warning that, if the industry's standards should lag too far behind reasonable
expectations, it is the role of the courts to impose higher standards. The TJ. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737, 740
(2d Cir.
1932) ("Courts must in the end say what is required...").
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The Web itself is young and the legal issues it raises are diverse. Although certain
issues fit relatively neatly under existing law,229 other issues can find nothing more
direct than a rough analogy. 230 The diversity and newness of issues, when combined
with the fluidity and flexibility of the U.S. federalist system, compel the conclusion
that the federalist system has the potential to be particularly well suited to the
application of law to the Web. Along with the potential, the mix creates both the
challenge to use the toolbox of the federalist system to develop effective law for the
Web and the near-moral responsibility to do so well. 3

229. With "relatively" being a key word. For example, copyright is easy when one person copies another
person's work and posts it on his/her Web site. See, e.g., Playboy Enterprises v. Webbworld, 991 F. Supp. 543, 549
(N.D. Tex. 1997). It becomes more complicated, though, when the copying user incorporates the creating user's
content via a hyperlink; Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 280 F.3d 934, 938 (9th Cir. 2002). The potential for such
complexity is increased by the Web's trend toward more fine-tuned identification of online material. See, e.g., RFC
2396: Uniform Resource Identifiers (URI): Generic Syntax, § 1.2 URI, URL, and URN (IETF RFC, 1998), at
http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2396.txt.
230. Such as the analogy to medicine for malpractice for Web site operators. See supra note 125 and
accompanying text.
231. Cf Luke 12:48 (King James) ("For unto whomsoever much is given, of him shall much be required.").

